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THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1812

Steven E. Siry, M.A.
Morehead State University, 1980

Director of Thesis:

Dr. Stuart S. Sprague

"The relationship between party politics and James Madison's
1812 decision for war and a reevaluation of De Witt Clinton's 1811_;
1812 presidential challenge to Madison are the subjects of this
thesis.
A significant part of my work is based on a provocative chapter
from John C. A. Stagg's doctoral dissertation.

In addition, I have

used extensively Irving Brant's multi-volume James Madison, and an
essay by Norman K. Ri'sjord on the 1812 election has. been of great value
concerning the political situation within individual states.

Primary

sources used include the writings of the major Republican leaders and
runs of prominent newspapers.
I have interpreted the primary reason for the declaration of war
in 1812 as being due to political expediency.

During Madison's first

two presidential years he was. faced with increased dissent within the
Republican party by those desirous of a belligerent approach towards

(v)

Great Britain for nationalistic, economic, and/or. political reasons.
Madison was not going to remain a spectator of this internal factionalism within the Republican party while waiting for the conflict in
Europe to end and thereby solve America·• s diplomatic problems.
saw the dangers caused by the malcontents over foreign affairs.

He
An

insurgent uprising would have a devastatingly divisive effect if the
malcontents threw their support to another presidential candidate in
1812.

Madison was prepared to act to meet this threat.

Beginning in

March, 1811 the President initiated a dual approach towards dissenters.
This involved placating the pro-war faction of the Republican party
while breaking all ties with those malcontents whose disenchantment
could not be removed by merely holding a more belligerent attitude
in foreign affairs.
The Federalists opposed Madison's continuation of Jefferson's
economic policies as well as the idea of war with Great Britain.

With

this web of conflict between the Federalists and the· Republicans and
with the dissension in the Republicans' own ranks, De Witt Clinton
saw a chance to capture the Presidency.

Consequently, Clinton

challenged the ruling Virginia based party by forging a coalition of
anti-Madisonians and most Federalists.

Despite the opinion of many

historians, the New Yorker was politically astute; his ambitions were
advanced by calculated decisions which came very close to success.
But the events that Clinton used to oppose Madison were also the events
that prompted. the President's counter-actions that kept the New
Yorker from victory.

(vi)

The election results showed a sectional vote •. Every state
located east of the Delaware river (save Vermont) gave its electoral
vote to Clinton.

And every state south and west ?f the Delaware

river (save Delaware) gave its. electoral.vote.to Madison.
divided.

Maryland

Of the original. thirteen states, 'Madison won ninety electoral

votes to Clinton's eighty-nine, a virtual tie.

But the five new

states, particularly the four of the West that had obtained 'from the
Virginian the war they had clamored for., . gave. their thirty-eight votes
_and the election to, Madison.
Madison's politically motivated actions saved his Presidency
and prevented a spl~tting of the Republican party. But the President
.
.
also led the nation on an untimely and ill-prepared crusade. Delay
would have been diplomati'cally and militarily the wiser course.
Political circumstances, however,.had led Madison since 1811 to re.frain from any period of procrastination.

Accepted by:
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The latent causes of faction are • • • sown in the nature of
man; and we see them everywhere brought into different degrees of
activity, according to the different circumstances of civil society.
A zeal for different opinions • • • concerning government, and many
other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment of
different leaders ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power.
have, in turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual
animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress
each other than to cooperate for their common good • • •
Federalist No. 10

JAMES MADISON AND THE MALCONTENTS
(i)

James Madison came to the Presidency in 1809 as Thomas
Jefferson's hand-picked successor.

The times were unpropitious for a

President advocating continued economic solutions to diplomatic questions
because a majority of Americans would no longer be satisfied by a
realistic though inconclusive foreign policy.

In the eyes of many,

moderation had come to mean lukewarm patrio~ism.

The seeds of discord

had been sown in the final years of Jefferson's Presidency; Madison
would reap the harvest.
The diminutive Virginian had been the heir apparent since 1800.
When in 1808 Jefferson decided t~ follow Washington's example and not
seek a third term, Madison, with key support from influential Republican
leaders, overcame the opposition candidacies of George Clinton and
James Monroe to win the Presidency.
consent than by acclamation.

He was elected, however, more by

He did not command the esteem that

Jefferson held, and he inherited a party threatened by dissension.
Dissatisfied Republicans looked on warily and waited to see the-direction
in which Madison would lead the nation.
unsatisfactory, they rebelled.

When that direction proved

Thus, within two years of his being

elected, Madison faced a political crisis of ominous proportions.
(ii)

Nationally there was a dissident group of Republicans who opposed
Madison, desiring hostilities with Britain and/or opposing Madison for
personal reasons.

Individuals from the middle Atlantic states had an

(2)

additional complaint.

Their region had rapidly increased in population

and consequently increased their voting strength in Congress and in the
Electoral College.

The region, however, felt neglected in its ability

to influence national policy.
Dynasty."

They resented more than ever the "Virginia

The dissidents tired of a political system that lacked new

concepts as alternatives to the "Virginia Dynasty's" connnercial restrictions and the Federalists' desire for free trade subject to foreign
regulations.

This disenchantment endangered the old Jeffersonian

coalition which had been anchored in Virginia and New York.
Western states were unhappy with the government's inability or
unwillingness to move the Indians beyond the Mississippi.

To some

dissidents, it was believed that the British agents and traders disobeyed the official government.policy which called for stopping the
agitation of Indians, and instead, at times, Britishers were provoking
the Indians to attack Americans.

The political importance of Western

unrest can be seen by the section's dramatic increase in population and
. . 1 power. 1
po 1 itica
Madison realized that it would be extremely difficult

to be reelected if he did not retain the support of the West.
By early 1811 the Eastern malcontents 2 were attempting to alter
the Madison Administration's policies, or failing to achieve that, to
remove him from power.

The insurgents were concentrated in Pennsylvania,

Maryland, Virginia, and New York.

The insurgency began in mid-1807

when Thomas Ritchie, editor of Virginia's Richmond Enquirer, and his
cousin Spencer Roane pushed for energetic anti-British measures on the
heels of the Chesapeake affair.

Senator Wilson Cary Nicholas, one of

the Jeffersonian floor leaders, was advocating war.

By the following

(3)

year, Nicholas held the embargo and commercial restrictions in contempt,
and because of these measures he refused in 1810 to return to Congress.
Nicholas, two other Virginians, John W. Eppes and John G. Jackson, plus
David R. Williams of South Carolina, composed the core of a Republican
pro-war group. 3

Advocating war for natio~alistic, political, and

economic reasons, they were the precursors of the famed 1811-1812

"war hawks."
The initial move against the Madison Administration came when
the President's chief lieute~ant, Albert Gallatin, was attacked by
Robert and Samuel Smith of Maryland and William Duane of Pennsylvania.
In 1808, the Smiths and William Branch Giles had led a group in the
Senate that blocked Madison's appointment of Gallatin as Secretary
of State.

Gallatin's appointment would not only have threatened their

presidential ambitions since they could not use the State position as a
stepping stone, but also the choice disregarded the key support they
have given Madison in 1808 that helped fend off the Clinton-Monroe
challenge for the Presidency.
as Secretary of State.
will.

Madison finally appointed Robert Smith

The controversy, however, left a legacy of ill-

The Smiths would continue to oppose the Madison Administration,

believing hi_s foreign policy 'to be too pro-French, and opposing
Gallatin's attempt to recharter the Bank-of the United States. 4
Duane, too, aimed his attacks at Gallatin.

Jefferson claimed

that such attacks were based upon the belief that Gallatin told John
Randolph that Madison had "no cabinet," and that Gallatin was hostile
to Jefferson.

Jefferson declared that the first item had been taken

out of context and the other was false.

Despite their lack of basis,

(4)
Jefferson believed that such opinions led to attempts to drive the
most able man, except for Madison, from government.5
Actually, Duane held grudges against Gallatin.

In 1802 Gallatin

had cut off Duane's lucrative government printing contract because the
Philadelphian was over-charging.

Furthermore, Duane had been a

regular correspondent of Jefferson's but such communication had ended
when Madison was elected.

Duane blamed Gallatin for this. 6

Overall, the malcontents had two main complaints against Gallatin.
They considered the Treasury Secretary a roadblock to energetic foreign
affairs.
Gallatin.

And secondly, many malcontents held personal grudges against
7

Thus, in early 1811 it was ·the Treasury Secretary who received

the brunt of the hostility directed towards the Administration.

Madison

realized that such attacks endangered his reelection bid; that it would
be only a matter of time before the most severe criticism was leveled
at himself.
On March 18, 1811 James Monroe wrote an extremely candid and
prophetic letter to Senator George Brent of Virginia.

It read in part:

I am aware that our public affairs are far from beingin a
tranquil and secure state. I may add that there is much
reason to fear that a crisis is approaching of a very
dangerous tendency; one which menaces the overthrow of the
whole Republican party. Is the Administration impressed
with this sentiment and prepared to act on it? Are things
in such a state as to allow the Administration to take the
whole subject into consideration, and to provide for the
safety of the country and of free government by such measures
as circumstances may require and a comprehensive view of them
suggest?· Or are we pledged by wha~ is already done to remain
spectators of the interior movement, in the expectation of
some change abroad as t_he ground on which we are_ to act?8
Indeed, Madison was impressed with the situation.

He was not

going to remain a spectator of the "interior movement" (the internal

(5)

factionalism.within the Republican party), while waiting for the conflict
in Europe to end and thereby solve America's diplomatic problems.
He saw the dangers caused by the malcontents over foreign affairs.
insurgent uprising, particularly if the Eastern malcontents gained
influence over the Western states, would have been devastatingly
divisive.

Madison was prepared to act to meet this threat.

An

(6)
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(7)

But if they are carried further, and pushed w.i.th violence,
especially in the Congress, or by those who have acted under the
government, they• drive the members in the Congress, and the
people at large, into the necessity of Clinging to and supporting
the ch: Magistrate for the purpose of supporting themselves;
that is, of saving the.party from ruin. Thus the misconduct
of the adm.n, which under another mode of investigation and
exposure would produce its removal, might become by a violent
one, the cause of increasing its strength and ascendancy over
the party, so long at least as the party lasted." James Monroe
to John Taylor, 19 November 1810, Stanislaus M. Hamilton, ed.,
The Writings of James Monroe, 7 Vols. (New York: G. P. Putnam's
Sons, 1901), 5: 151.

DE WITT CLINTON BEGINS HIS CHALLENGE
In New York, Madison, like Jefferson before him, had favored
the Livingstons in their battle with the Clintonians for political
supremacy in the state.

This was due to three reasons:

(1) their

friendship with Chancellor Robert R. Livingston, (2) the Clintonians'
anti-Federalist roots, and (3) because the Virginians sought to
maintain a balance of power between the Livingstons and Clintons to
prevent either from gaining power enough to challenge the Virginians
nationally.
This Clinton - "Virginia Dynasty" animosity increased dramatically
in 1808, when Madison, not George Clinton, obtained the Republican
presidential nomination.

This division was further deepened when

Madison favored Clinton's rivals for government posts. 1 When in 1810
George Clinton's health deteriorated, the Clinton mantle passed to
his nephew, De Witt.2
De Witt Clinton had been a powerful political figure in New
York since the beginning of the century.

As a member of the Council

of Appointment and as mayor of New York City he had handed out
offices, money, and charitable contributions.

In this manner he

consolidated the backing of supporters during the continual infighting
of New York politics.

Moreover, his political yosition was enhanced

by his standing among the Irish and other foreign born citizens.

He

was greatly admired because as a United States Senator he had obtained
a reduction in the period of naturalization from fourteen to five
years, and he helped repeal the alien and sedition acts. 3

(9)

Clinton was opportunistic and pragmatic.
but without a strict ideology.

He was a man of integrity

Yet among a generation of political

figures who were thought to hold principle in more esteem than
policy, Clinton was an outsider. 4
In late 1810 and early 1811 unrest by the malcontents caused
Clinton to turn his attention in earnest towards challenging James
Madison for President.

The death of Lieutenant-Governor John Broome

in August, 1810 triggered the initial step.

The state legislature

passed an act in early 1811 that called for the election of Broome's
replacement.

Clinton, who had been appointed mayor of New York

City in January of that year,.wished to fill the position and on March
14, 1811, the Republican legislative caucus nominated Clinton for the
lieutenant-governorship.
Why did Clinton seek a position that was impotent and that
contrasted glaringly to the power of Governor Daniel D. Tompkins?
The answer lies in Clinton's presidential aspirations.

Clinton wanted

to maintain better party control and therefore he needed to be in
Albany during the legislative sessions·.

Such control of New York

was essential to his presidential designs.

He would have preferred

to have been selected as a state legislator but he feared he might
be passed over.
Immediately, however, Clinton was faced with a challenge to
his plans.

The Martling Men, a splinter group within the New York

Tammany Society, had been long and bitter enemies of Clinton.

They

first clashed in 1802 when Clinton spoke in opposition to Aaron Burr's
intriguing against Jefferson.

The bitterness grew when Clinton removed

(10)
Burr and his supporters from the directorate of the.Manhattan Bank.
In 1809 Clinton's agents vainly sought to reconcile the warring
camps.

The Martling Men in 1811, led by Teunis Wortman, claimed that

Clinton was looking only to advance his personal interests.
fore, they opposed his candidacy.
kins,

There-

The father-in-law of Governor Tomp-

Mangle Minthorne, presided at the initial meeting.

The group

proclaimed that Clinton no longer supported Madison and thus the Martling
Men nominated Marinus Willet for lieutenant-governor.
The meeting claimed that it supported the caucus system, -an
ironic statement since they themselves were attacking Clinton, the
nominee of the legislative Republican caucus.

As Clinton had feared,

Tammany nominated popular Nathan Sanford for the Assembly, and thus
prevented Clinton from considering an assembly race to gain a position
in Albany.

Sanford had been appointed by Madison to the high paying

position as a New York district attorney, and it is doubtful that
Sanford would associate with the Martling Men unless he knew that
Madison approved.
The Federalists nominated Nicholas Fish making the election a
three-way race.
bitter.

As election day approached the contest became more

A Clintonian meeting at New York's Union Hotel, was broken up

by the Martling Men.

Nevertheless, Clinton's support held together

though he lost New York City.

Upstate brought Clinton victory.

Ironically, many members of Tammany, who opposed Clinton because of
his alleged support of Federalist interests, voted for the Federalist
candidate Fish.5

It was indicative of the factionalism and inclination

towards temporary coalitions that made the New York political scene
ripe for open rebellion within the party.

(11)
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MADISON'S NEW STRATEGY
(i)

Clinton's "availability" endangered Madison's political existence
and southern dominance of the Republican party.
to other problems.

This was in addition

William Duane's "Philadelphia Junta" exploited the

bad relations between the Administration and Pennsylvania's Governor,
Simon Snyder.

Bad blood existed over the Olmstead Affair, a controversy

concerning Snyder's initial opposition to federal enforcement of a Supreme
Court decision against Pennsylvania. 1 Additionally, John Armstrong,
Minister to France, resigned in August, 1810 over what he believed was
the Administration's pro-French foreign policy.

De Witt Clinton's

brother-in-law, Ambrose Spencer, brought together Armstrong and the
Clintonians in April, 1811.

The meeting sought to find ways to make

New York a more powerful force at the national level.

Madison feared,

however, that Armstrong might settle in Pennsylvania and become
Clinton I s running mate •. 2
In letters dated March 18, April 1, and April 19 the President
wrote Jefferson that he believed Armstrong's animosity stemmed not
from foreign policy but rather from Madison's reinstatement of David
Warden to the Paris Consulship, a position from which Armstrong had had
him removed.

Madison believed it might become "the ground of an open

hostility. 113
(ii)
Congress, in the spring of 1810, repealed the non-intercourse
acts which prohibited trade with England and France.

But if either

(13)

France or Britain repealed their acts against neutrals, the United
States would again enforce a non-importation policy against the"other
country.

Consequently, when in August, 1810, Napoleon stated that the

Berlin and Milan decrees no longer applied to America if the United
States made England respect its rights, Madison jumped at this chance
and proclaimed non-importation with Great Britain on November 2, 1810.
Congress confirmed this policy by an Act of March 2, 1811.
Madison's action became.controversial.

4

It was apparent that

French assurances that the Berlin and Milan decrees were revoked were
extremely questionable.

Madison did not denounce this deception, but

pressed the British to renounce their orders-in-council.5

Secretary of

State Robert Smith stated privately that France was violating its word
and that Great Britain should be admitted to trade equality. 6 Madison
saw Smith as a saboteur of his foreign policy, and the President felt
now he had more reason than ever to remove Smith from his Administration.7
Yet Madison, despite his desire to be rid of Smith, could not
act until after the Senate, in which Samuel Smith was a major force,
had passed the non-importation amendments.
waited until after Congress adjourned.

Thus, the President

Such a delay also enabled

Madison to have Smith's replacement serve some eight or nine months
before his appointee would have to go before the Senate for confirmation.
After Congress adjourned, Gallatin offered to resign.
allow Madison to dismiss Smith at the same time.
the resignation.

This would

But Madison refused

Instead, ·through Senator Brent of Virginia, he

(14)

inquired unofficially whether James Monroe, recently elected
Governor of Virginia, would accept the State position. 8

On either

March 19 or March 20 the President asked for Smith's resignation,
and offered him the position of Minister to the Court of St.
Petersburg.

On

the 20th Madison officially offered Smith's position

to Monroe. 9
Less than two months earlier Monroe had written to John Taylor
stating:
The truth is that on points of policy there has been
great difference of opinion between the adm.n & me. My
letters to you shew that fact. This applies to the
rejection of the treaty (Monroe-Pinkney rreaty of 1806),
and to the measures that have resulted· from it. There
can be no doubt that if I had had any weight in the
publick councils our course would have been a different
one. My views of policy have not altered, nor has
anything escaped me to countenance such an idea.10
But the promise of power and the national crisis of the time led
Monroe to reconsider his position.

He consulted political figures

including John Taylor of Caroline and John Randolph of Roanoke.
Randolph opposed his accepting, but the others, hoping Monroe could
influen~e the direction of foreign policy, urged acceptance.

With

this support, Monroe accepted, though knowing that he did so on
Madison's terms. 11
Monroe's appointment aided the President.

It rid the Administra-

tion of Robert Smith, it improved relations with the Congress, it kept
Monroe from being a contender for the Presidency, and it helped unite
the badly divided Virginia Republican party.
drawbacks.

But it also had its

Discontent in the Middle States posed the greatest threat

to Madison and the Republican party.

Monroe, being a Virginian, added

to the problem.

In addition, if Clinton had had any doubts about his

candidacy they must have disappeared with the appointment of Monroe,
for his position as Secretary of State seemed to forecast a continuation
of the "Virginia Dynasty. nl2
The Smith-Monroe shuffle indicated that the President was
charting a new course, one that he would follow until the Presidential
election of 1812.

This course consisted in breaking all ties with

those malcontents whose disenchantment could not be won over by
Madison merely holding a more belligerent pose on foreign affairs.

But

at the same time Madison did continue, as he had since the invoking of
non - importation against Great Britain in November 1810, his policy
of placating pro-war Republicans.
In addition, Madison moved to mend his Pennsylvania fences by
appointing Gabriel Duval of Maryland, a pro-Smith figure, to the Supreme
Court, and replacing him in his position as Comptroller of the Treasury
with Richard Rush, a Snyderite.

And Treasury Secretary Gallatin pre-

vented Madison's opponents from gaining patronage power in Philadelphia.
This alliance to the majority Republican faction in Pennsylvania
brought Madison needed support. 13
Responding to these moves, the malcontents mounted a counteroffensive.

Duane said Monroe's appointment was a sell out to the

British; the Smiths attacked Monroe's record during the negotiations of
18.06.

Replying, Madison wrote in the National Intelligencer that

prevailing problems were Britain's fault.

He stated that the British

blockade, orders-in-council, and impressment would have to end,

(16)
though he had told Monroe that impressment was not a major obstacle to
a settlement. 14
Robert Smith followed up this exchange with a new attack.

Just

prior to British Minister Augustus Foster's arrival in America, Smith
published a pamphlet, "Address to the People of the United States."
He charged that Madison was a meek Francophile who endangered his nation
through his foreign policies.

A more energetic man was required for

the Presidency, one who would maintain American rights.

Smith's

"Address" was refuted by Joel Barlow, Minister-designate to France.
Barlow claimed that Smith's only motive was to create opposition to
Madison without cause.

15

The National Intelligencer said of Smith's

pamphlet:
We trust we shall, after this, hear no more of want of.
energy in Mr. Madison's conduct respecting our foreign relations,
especially not as contrasted with the policy of Mr. Smith,·
as deducible from his address. The charge of subservience to
France rest on no better foundation.16
This conflict showed that Gallatin did not remain as the lone
target for the Smiths, Duane, and their allies.

The malcontents were

now taking-aim at the President, and in retaliation Madison was
pursuing a new course.

Only the coming months could tell whether the

detractors would bring down Madison or if the Virginian would emerge
triumphant.

.(17)
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TOWARDS WAR
Jefferson complained during the height of the Smith controversy:
The two last Congresses have been the theme of the
most licentious reprobation for printers thirsting after
war, some against France and some against England. But
the people wish for peace with both. They feel no incumbency
on them to become the reformers of the other hemisphere,
and to inculcate, with fire and sword, a return to moral
order. When, indeed, peace shall become more losing than
war, they may owe to their interests what these
1
Quixotes are clamoring for on false estimates of honor.
Jefferson, like other Republicans, had to reconcile the conflict
between personal opinion and Madison's movement towards war.

Ultimately

to Jefferson the party was more important than the policy of the moment. 2
"To the principles of union," he wrote, "I sacrifice all minor
differences of opinion. 113
Madison's more belligerent attitude began to pay off when
Thomas Ritchie came out in favor of the President and against Smith. 4
Madison's advantage coming from favoring the pro-war faction was
enhanced when it appeared that Russia's imminent break with Napoleon's
Continental System would lead to a Russo-French war.

France was

expected to win, leaving the British more dependent on the United States.
Therefore, in Madison's opinion, the time to pressure Britain on
America's grievances was at hand.

If war resulted, the Administration's

situation was more favorable than in the past as the Republicans now
controlled Massachusetts, a state necessary for a successful invasion
of Canada.

Given the Administration's attitudes towards the world

_situation in July 1811, it would have been very difficult for the Administration and the British to have reached a mutually satisfying agreement. 5
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When the talks between British Minister Augustus Foster and
Secretary of State Monroe failed to reach an agreement, Madison on July
24, 1811, issued a proclamation calling the twelfth Congress into early
session. 6

The President's November S State of the Union message was

another step towards war.

Madison declared:

I must now add that the period is arrived which claims
from the legislative guardians of the national rights a
system of more ample provisions for maintaining them. Notwithstanding the scrupulous justice, the protracted moderation,
and the multiplied efforts on the part of the United States
to substitute for the accumulating dangers to the peace of the two
countries all the mutual advantages of re-established
friendship and confidence, we have seen that the ·British cabinet
perseveres not only in withholding a remedy for other wrongs,
so long and so loudly calling for it, but in the execution,
brought home to the threshold of our territory, of measures which
under existing circumstances have the character as well as the
effect of war on our lawful commerce.
With this evidence of hostile inflexibility in trampling
on rights which no independent nation can relinquish, Congress
will fill the duty of putting the United States into an armor
and an attitude demanded by the crisis and corresponding with
the national spirit and expectations.7
Hoping to even further ride the wave of war spirit, Madison in
December 1811-January 1812 wrote letters to the legislatures of Tennessee,
North Carolina, and South Carolina agreeing with their previous statements
that American rights must be defended.

To Governor Hawkins of North

Carolina he wrote:
I heartily join in the hope you express that the state
of our national affairs will have its proper influences in
converting party feelings and prejudices into united
exertions against the aggressions and insults which
8
the just conduct of our Country has failed to avert •
The path Madison intended to take was clear.

The progress towards

a declaration of war against Great Britain had begun.
turning back.

There was no

(21)
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PRAGMATIC POLITICS
In the late summer of 1811 Clinton saw an opportunity to-gain
support from New York Federalists,

At the August 6 Columbia College

commencement exercises, graduating students each gave an oration.
One graduate was told to tone down the political aspects of his speech
which were-offensive to the Federalist dominated faculty and
administration.

He refused.

Consequently, he was informed that he would

not receive his diploma on that day.

A disturbance followed when two

students, Hugh Maxwell and Gulian C. Verplanck, demanded to know
the reason for such an outrageous act against a fellow student.

Sub-

sequently, Verplanck, Maxwell, and others were called before Mayor De
Witt Clinton's court on charges of rioting.
possibilities.

Clinton saw polftical

His slim margin in the lieutenant-governorship election

was caused by local district Republicans having for the most part voted
for Willett or Fish.

Thus, Clinton felt he had little to lose among

Republican support and much to gain among Federalists.

In the end, he

fined Verplanck and Maxwell two hundred dollars each, and the action
1
was popular among the Federalist ranks.
Attempting to acquire additional support, Clinton looked to the
West with a view to enlarging his geographical base.
most attractive state.

Kentucky was the

It had increased its Congressional strength

dramatically as a result of the new 1810 census, and it would be a
great triumph to wrest this Republican stronghold from Madison.

Clinton's

agents had suggested that Henry Clay would be an ideal running mate for
Clinton,

In January, 1812, when Clinton was in Washington, rumor had
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it that a Republican Congressional caucus rejected Madison and had
chosen instead a Clinton-Clay ticket.

But Clay's friends declared it to

be a falsehood, started only to create trouble, and thus, the trial
balloon, launched by the pro-Clinton press, burst. 2
Throughout most of December and January, Clinton and Gouverneur
Morris were in Washington, promoting the New York canal project.
Others saw political motives for their presence.

Senator James A

Bayard of Delaware wrote to Caesar Rodney, December 22, 1811:

"The

characters of the two men (Clinton and Morris) are pretty well known
'
and it is rather supposed that they mean
to open a road to the presidency

than a canal from the lakes.
in intrigue."

Tho' a young republic we are already old

And on February 1, 1812 Bayard wrote:

"Morris who was

here nearly two .months once appeared upon the subject of the canal
before a Connnittee of the House and Clinton who came on the same
business was never heard to say a word about it. 113
Madison saw Clinton's canal project as a means to win New York
State's support and possibly Western support for his presidential
bid.

Madison believed that Federal aid for the project was unconstitu-

tional but he saw the political dangers involved.

Thus, after meeting

with Clinton and Morris at the White House, the President sent a
message to Congress which directed that body to take "'whatever steps
may be proper on their part."'

Because the canal situation could only

be detrimental to Madison if he opposed it, his message avoided outright·opposition without going against his constitutional beliefs. 4
Madison, the day he met with Clinton an~ Morris, attempted to
remove another political problem by signing a reapportionment bill that
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showed the great increases of population in the North.

The Congress

had handled the minimum population in each district in such a way as to
create large unrepresented areas in. the South.

This gave the North an

increase of eighteen seats, thus mollifying the outcry from New York and
other northern states for a greater voice in the national government.·
Even so, the Madison Administration made sure the increased representation was mostly in Republican areas. 5
Following these actions, Madisun ·initiated another political
maneuver.

The Republicans in the Virginia assembly caucused in February

and chose electors who endorsed Madison.
helped stop Monroe's candidacy.

This type of action had in 1808

On March 7 Pennsylvania followed suit,

but such support could not insure a Congressional caucus nomination
unless a large number of states gave the President their backing. 6
The Clintonians considered exercising a number of options.

They

still held out hope of obtaining Western support .despite their setback
in proposing a Clinton-Clay ticket.

At a secret Albany caucus on March

16, Clintonians decided to remain inactive until states of the North and
West could be sounded out on their opinions.

Towards this end a

committee of nine was appointed. 7
Concurrently, the Clintonians looked to Washington in hope of
finding if there was any support for a Republican Congressional
I

()

nomination of Clinton.

With this in mind, the Clintonians enticed

Congressman Thomas Sammons to leave in March for a journey to Washington. 8
But before Clinton could hope for any support in Washington, he knew he
had to demonstrate his New York support, particularly the gaining

(25)

of a nomination for the Presidency by the Republican legislature of
that state.

Thus, New York in the spring of 1812 was the scene of

a major political confrontation.
(ii)
Previously, in February, 1811, the United States Senate considered
the renewal of the charter of the Bank of the United States. 9

The

debate centered on the.question as to whether or not a national bank
was so vital to the government's economic policies as to be considered
applicable to the implied powers clause of the Constitution.

Politically,

the Clintons and the Smiths hoped that if Gallatin's request for renewal
was defeated it would cause such financial problems that Madison in
. h t not b e renominate.
·
d 10
1812 mig
Vice-President George Clinton broke a 17-17 tie, casting the
deciding vote against renewal. 11

This decision did not result in such

Treasury problems as to hinder Madison politically, but the nonrenewal did send a large amount of uninvested cash capital back to the
stockholders.

People realized that New York City was replacing

Philadelphia as the country's commercial center.

This led financiers,

many of whom were Federalists, to attempt to establish a large bank in
New York -- The Bank of America.

This created a great stir as the bank

was perceived as the successor to the Bank of the United States, which
12
many considered as Federalist and British controlled.
Chartering the Bank of America became·the focus of a vicious
political confrontation that threatened Clinton's quest for the
Presidency.

For Clinton, political considerations overrode all others.

Financially he would suffer if the Bank of America was chartered -- he
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was connected with its competitor, the Manhattan Bank.

Clinton

explained that if forced to vote, he would oppose the charter, but he
was not going to be drawn into the quarrel.

In taking this stand, Clinton

was severely criticized, for in 1805 he had opposed chartering the
Merchants Bank because it would hurt the Republican party. 13

Jabez

Hammond, a contemporary of Clinton and chronicler of New York politics
of the period, states:
this occasion, as on many others, Mr. Clinton afforded
evidence of a lamentable defect in his character as a
politician. That defect was this: a neglect to cast
about for means for the accomplishment of his end. His
objects were always magnificent, his ends were always
such as evinced an elevated and lofty mind, but he did
not seem to be aware of the necessity of providing ways
and means to accomplish these ends • • •
On

-It is not improbable to me that the ardor of his ambitions
hurried him into a determination to engage in this contest
without any regular or fixed scheme of action.14
To ·:the contrary, however, it would seem that Clinton was well
aware of the ways and means that.were required to accomplish the
desired ends.

He had realized that he could not capture the

Congressional caucus nomination.

Therefore, he was forced to forge a

coalition of dissatisfied Republicans and most Federalists.

Practicality

required that he begin such a coalition in his home state and build
outward.

Obviously he understood that he was running the risk of

alienating a large part of his Republican support by his "alliance"
with Federalists.

Clinton was required to make completely different

appeals to the two groups.

He initiated his first major move towards

building this coalition during the bank charter debate.
Clinton hoped his charter stand would prevent him from alienating
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either group.
detriment.

The deadlock on this issue, however, worked to his

For those bank advocates who were dissatisfied Republicans

refused to caucus to nominate Clinton until the bank was chartered.
Clinton was extremely anxious that his nomination by the New York
caucus occur before the Republican Congressional caucus renominated
President Madison ..
nomination in

15

Clinton probably believed that an early

New York might cause the Congressional caucus to

split.
The bank bill passed the Assembly by a vote of fifty-two to fortysix and was sent to the Senate.

There a Committee of the Whole moved

that it be rejected, but this measure failed.

It became obvious that the

bill would soon pass and become law subject to any action by the Council
of Revision.

This was the situation on }!arch 27, 1812 when Governor

Tompkins sent the legislature a message informing it that the session
was prorogued until May 21.

The governor declared that the bank

applicants had employed or tried to employ corrupt means to assure the
passage of the charter.

16

Tompkins' accusation was based on the fact

that a powerful lobby had been organized to achieve passage of the
bank charter.

The managers of this lobby included Solomon Southwick,

a devoted friend to De Witt Clinton.

And the managers employed a group

of assistants who were not highly esteemed. 17
According to Niles Weekly Register the prorogation by Governor
Tompkins was".

. in order, we are told, to ascertain the public

sentiment through the intervening elections, on t~is momentous matter. 1118
But a Clintonian paper stated:

"A more aristocratical and arbitrary
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measure, we hesitate not to say, was never, under similar circumstances,

adopted in any government, short of an absolute military despotism. 19
the Clinton men and the banlonen believed Tompkins' action was intended
to destroy Clinton's presidential hopes and to allow himself to be
a future presidential contender.

20

Most likely, Tompkins' decision was

made predominantly to prevent Clinton's New York caucus nomination
until after Madison•~ Congressional caucus renomination.

By proroguing

the legislature, Tompkins prevented action on the bill and consequently
Clinton was forced to wait until late in May to obtain the Republican
endorsement in New York,

In the meantime, Madison could act.
(iii)

During the weeks after prorogation, Tompkins wrote letters to
prominent New Yorkers declaring that Clinton was completely committed
in his opposition to the proposed bank.

On April 6 he wrote to

Colonel Henry Rutgers, stating:
Suspicions seem to be entertained in New York that the
Lieutenant-Governor has either been friendly to or silent
about the Bank. Rest assured,, my Dear Sir, great
injustice is done him by such insinuation, He has
uniformly been as decided, steady, and open in his opposition to the Bank as I have been and as I really believe,
interested himself more, and taken greater pains to
convince members of the impropriety of voting for it,
than I have done.
His real friends will, I do not
hesitate to say, be equally decided and animated upon the
subject now pending if a disposition for·union and mutual
exertions shall be met by a corresponding temper on bhe
part of the Madisonians.21
By this method Tompkins apparently hoped to prevent a split in the
Republican party until at least after the April elections.
stated:

He also

And
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This is the first letter I have ever ventured to
write to you or any other person respecting the
afflicting dissensions in New York; and I trust
you will ascribe this departure from my usual
studied silence on that subject to an anxious
solicitude, if you view the importance of the
approaching Election in the same light I do, to
animate and draw forth your kind and good offices
in producing a reconciliation amongst the
Republicans of the city, at least at this election. 22
Once the Republicans controlled the legislature there would
remain six months to dissuade Clinton from continuing his campaign,
or that failing, to destroy his political base.

Despite Tompkins'

best efforts, the Republicans failed to gain control of the lower
house.

And though the joint houses found a Republican advantage, 23

there was, nevertheless·, a problem for the Madisonian faction.

If

the Clintonians and Federalists combined they would have a majority.
Madison was renominated on May 18 by the Republican Congressional
caucus by a vote of eighty for Madison and two abstensions.
one eligible Congressmen were not present.

Fifty-

Though many were out of

town for reasons other than politics, the turn out was indicative of
the strain within the party.

John Langdon of New Hampshire, first

President Pro-Tempore of the Senate, received the vice-presidential
nomination with sixty-four votes to Elbridge Gerry's sixteen votes.
The caucus adopted a resolution advocating its candidates, and declared,
as they had four years before, that caucus members acted only as private
citizens.

The vice-presidential nomination was evidential of the Southern
states' control over the Republican party; Langdon's nomination was.
due to their influence and desires.

Northern Republicans preferred
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Gerry, but the South, assisted by the obedient Pennsylvanians, dictated
24
the second place on the ticket as well as the first.
The New England
press acquiesced in the selection of a Southern nominee for the Presidency as New England, not New York, received the vice-presidential
nominee.

25

But Langdon, citing his seventy years, declined the position,
and forced a second caucus.

Here Gerry was chosen.

26

Gerry

would be of som~ help in New England, particularly Massachusetts which
Madison still hoped to carry, and his age made him no threat to the
Virginia succession planned for 1816.

At the second caucus ten more

Republicans supported Madison, thus more than two-thirds of the
Republicans in Congress came out for the President.

27

Clintonians immediately attacked Madison's nomination.

The

Connecticut Courant inaccurately reported on May 26 that the Republican
Congressional caucus had been unable to decide on a candidate; that the
28
Northern members had·not even attended.
Within a matter of weeks,
Madison's caucus nomination had been approvingly confirmed by the
Republican legislatures of nine states.

29 Madison, with Tompkins'

help, had foiled Clinton's plan for splitting the Congressional caucus.
(iv)
Three days after the Republican Congressional caucus, the New
York State legislature reconvened.

Immediately the bank charter bill
30
was taken up and it passed the Senate.
By ending the impasse,
Clinton's moment had arrived.

On May 28 the Republican members of the

legislature ~aucused to consider nominating Clinton for the Presidency.
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Ninety-one of the ninety-five members in the New York Assembly were
present at the caucus.

Morgan Lewis and Nathan Sanford did not attend
31
for political reasons, and the other two were unavoidably absent.
The caucus did not innnediately move to nominate Clinton, for a

number of those present questioned the expediency of such action.

Some

feared Clinton's nomination would have a devastatingly divisive effect
on the Republican party; some doubted that Clinton had a chance to defeat
Madison; others supported the policies of the President; still others
feared that Clinton would do irreparable damage to his political
career by challenging the President during a time of mounting crisis.

32

But at this crucial point Pierre Van Cortlandt, Jr., and other
members of Congress arrived from Washington.

They pushed for Clinton's

nomination, and they presented letters from Postmaster-General Gideon
Granger imploring the caucus to nominate Clinton. 33

In the end, these

voices, in conjunction with the death of Vice-President George Clinton
the preceding month, helped obtain the support of the caucus.

34

The caucus passed a resolution to proceed to nominate a candidate for
President, and followe~ that with a unanimously supported resolution
to back Clinton.

The caucus then ordered the appointment of a

Connnittee of Seventeen, one from each Congressional district, to
further Clinton's election.

35

After adjournment, the Committee of Seventeen published a letter
entitled "To the People of the United States" stating that Clinton was
a peace candidate and advocated the Federalists' benevolent neutrality
36
attitude towards England.
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On the nomination, a Clintonian paper said:
This nomination speaks a language that will not be
misunderstood anywhere; and in our humble opinion, will
tend more to lower the proud crest of the lordly
Virginians than any measure which has been adopted
since the election of Mr. Jefferson to the Presidency
The people of all parties in the Northern and Eastern
sections of the Union have had their eyes opened by that
ruinous system of measures whi°ch has been pursued for
the last ten years; by a government pretending to be
the friends of the people but in reality their worst
enemies • • • It must rejoice the heart of every
good man, of every friend to his country, to find that the
democratic-republicans of the FIRST STATE OF THE UNION,
have dared to make a stand against the us~ pation and
overbearing aristocracy of Virginia • • •

7

The Madisonian press disagreed:
We cannot but view with extreme concern the late
nomination at Albany of a President of the U. States.
We respect the opinions of our fellow-men, and the
unanimity with which the measures passed certainly
entitles it to serious consideration. We are proud of
the talents of the candidate selected, and under other
circumstances would have hailed with cheerful acclamations
his nomination to the presidency. We are, however, of
the decided opinion, and freely express it, that this
nomination is extremely impolitic, and, if persisted in, the
division and ultimate ruin of the republican party
must ensue.

These untoward circumstances are much to be regretted
in the present state of both foreign and domestic
concerns, and when unanimity is above.all other objects
desirable . . • we • • • condemn the misguided zeal of
his friends, in thus prematurely making use of his name for
an object which cannot at this time be attained, and
for a competition which we confidentially anticipate he
will decline.. 38

(33)
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THE DECISION FOR WAR
Congress:fonal opponents, from November 1811 to February 1812,
ridiculed Madison's war preparedness proposals as either too much or too
little.

In addition, on a number of issues traditional Jeffersonian-

Republican opposition to excessive spending and permanent military
forces became a major problem for the Administration.

By February,

1812 it was apparent that Congress was moving cautiously towards war
while also opposing the means with which to wage it.
The Administration had to accept a·congressional commitment to
impose taxes only after the war had actually begun, and even this
decision was hotly debated before its passage on March 4, 1812.
Furthermore, a plan to have the national government supply arms to the
states' militia was defeated despite the Southern states being
severely under-supplied.

Then a proposal for the building of twelve

seventy-four gun ships of the line and twenty frigates was defeated
and appropriations for repairs was cut.
Only on troop increases did the Congress favor more expenditures
than did the Administration.

The President was forced to advocate

the raising of only ten thousand regular troops because funds did not
exist to arm-or clothe any number beyond this.

Congress' desire for

more than ten thousand regulars was primarily due to the Smith-Giles
faction in the Senate trying to make Gallatin and the Treasury
Department appear penny-pinching and unpatriotic.

It became

strikingly apparent that the primary goal for some of the malcontents
was the destruction of Madison's Presidency rather than the changing
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of American foreign policy.
As the spring of 1812 approached, Madison was looking for some
major event that would compel the Congress towards a more belligerent
stand.

He hoped that the Henry papers would provide this.

These

documents, which Madison submitted to Congress, showed that in
1809 while his Administration was negotiating with Great Britain's
government the British had sent a secret agent, John Henry, to New
England to find out whether British assistance would be accepted if the
New·England states decided to separate from the union or remain
neutral in case of war. 1 When Canadian and British officials refused
to pay Henry for the information he had gathered, he turned to the
United States.

Madison was seeking national unity whe~ he disclosed the

existence of the Henry papers.

The President did not try to imply

New England's complicity in the intrigue, only that of a small group.
Madison thereby hoped to get Federalists behind a drive for war.

2

On March 10 Gallatin wrote to Jefferson that the efforts to preserve
peace had failed because of the domestic factionalism.

Gallatin

added that war was unavoidable and that he hoped that the people
would unite behind the government to prevent the dissidents from
causing any more disunity.

He believed the Henry papers would end

all internal opposition due to public pressure.

3

But the Federalists and the Randolphites doubted that the Henry
'
papers _chang_ed things, rather they were of the opinion that Madison
was trying to influence the upcoming Massachusetts state elections.
They said that on February 20 Monroe received Henry's letter relating
what was in the agent's possession, but that at least twenty-five days

(39)

went by before the Secretary revealed their existence to Congress.
The delayed disclosure, just twenty-eight days before the Massachusetts election, was deemed political in nature, the Madisonians hoping
that the impact of the affair would not diminish by the time of the
election.

4

But with war expected, the Governor's "Gerrymandering,"

and the general unpopularity of the Republican Administration's
measures, the Federalists regained control of the state government.
Also, the papers contained no names and stated no acts; the
imputations pertained only to a conjectured situation.
quence, the initial excitement began to fade.

As a conse-

The effect of the

papers was diminished further when shortly after their public ·release
news of George Matthews revolution-organizing activities in East
Florida reached Washington (see Chapter three -- footnote no. 13).
Matthews, backed by the United States' government, was committing the
exact type of activity

that the Madison Administration was accusing

Great Britain of having attempted.

To protect their image as an

innocent neutral that had been wronged, the Administration disavowed
Matthew's actions.

5

Nevertheless, the effectiveness of the Henry

papers suffered as a consequence of the incident.
The Henry affair was the first of a series of Administration
initiated steps in its effort to force a stand on Britain's
activities.

The President considered a sixty day embargo which would

please those who wished to avoid war or to postpone the day of
decision, and it would allow Americans to bring their ships into
safety prior to any possible military action.

6

Additionally, however,

(40)

it would injure the British by stopping the shipment of provisions
to Spain.

Moreover, it was felt that by the end of the embargo

the Hornet would have returned with news concerning Britain's
decision on its orders-in-council.

But in mid-March the French

burned American ships along the coast from Philadelphia to
Boston.

7

Secretary of State Monroe blasted French Minister Seruries.

telling him that within a week the Administration had planned on
proposing the embargo, and the declaration of war was to follow
within a short time.

The French actions, however, had perhaps

completely endangered the Administration's progress. 8
The French actions aroused not just the anti-Madisonians who
had been promoting the idea of a triangular war, but also some proMadisonians believed that France as well as England should have war
declared upon it because of its actions against the United States.
Later, Jefferson wrote to Madison

concerning this:

The triangular war must be the idea of the Anglomen and
· the malcontents, in other words, the federalists and quids.
But it would reconcile neither. It would only change the
topic of abuse with the former, and not cure the mental
disease of the latter. It would prevent our eastern
capitalists and seamen from employment in privateering,
take away the only chance of conciliating them, and
keep them at home, idle, to swell the discontents; it would
completely disarm us of the most powerful weapon we can employ
against Great Britain, by shutting every port to our
prizes, and yet would not add a single vessel to their
number; it would shut every market to our agricultural
productions, and engender impatience and discontent with that
class which, in fact, composes the nation; it would
insulate us in general negotiations for peace, making all the
parties our opposers, and very indifferent about peace with us,
if they should have it with the rest of the world, and would
exhibit a solecism worthy of Don Quixote only, that of a
choice to fight two enemies at a time, rather than to take.
them by succession. And the only motive for all this is

(41)
a sublimated impartiality, at which the world will
laugh, and our own people will turn upon us in mass as
soon as it is explained to them, as it will be by the
very persons who are now laying that snare. 9
·
. Despite the "French crisis," the President soon felt
politically sound enough to send a confidential message to Congress
on April 1 asking for his sixty day embargo.

The Senate lengthened

the embargo to ninety days and the House adopted this amendment.
Madison signed the bill into law.

10

Then Madison considered Joel

Barlow's announcement of a possible commercial treaty with France
as placing the two nations back on good relations.

The President

hoped to get the United States moving solely and steadily
towards war with England.

On April 14 the National Intelligencer

.
Britain.
. . 11
resumedi ts appea l f or war against
Those who sought peace believed that.Congress' refusal to
create two additional war department bureaus was a promising sign.
The Smith group in the Senate had condemned the division of responsibility and declared that Secretary of War Eustis was to blame.

The

peace men attempted to bring about an adjournment of the Congress to
forestall any belligerent move by the President.
adjourn but the House voted against it.

The Senate voted to

12

On the extreme right John Randolph's Quids had opposed war
towards either France or England.

Their opposition to belligerency was

based on the belief that war would lead to centralization and
bureaucratization, and their cherished states' rights would be lost.
They distrusted all government bureaus, but particularly the War
Department which was for them a parasite upon the nation.
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For years the Quids had associated themselves with Virginia
Federalists.

Now as war approached they became allied, to a certain

extent, with other Federalists as well.

The fear of war brought

them together, and the fact that the Federalists now espoused a
states' rights position strengthened the bond.

Even in combination,

however, the two dissenting groups were weak, and their effective13
ness in Congress was correspondingly minimal.
In March, Madison was probably hoping to have Congress declare
war by the end of April.

This would rally the party behind him and

assure his renomination, thus slowing the Clinton challenge.

When

Clinton's plans were delayed by the bank controversy, Madison must
have been very optimistic.

However, the April elections brought a

resurgence of Federalism in New York and Massachusetts.

Most impor-

tantly, Federalist control of Massachusetts raised questions
as to whether an invasion of Canada was still possible.

Such an

invasion had always been considered central to any war plans, thus
this setback posed serious problems. 14
Even so, the movement of events made the possibility of war a
greater probability.
offensive.

Seeing the trend, the Clintonian press took the

On May 5 the Connecticut Courant reported that before

the embargo was enacted the House Connnittee on Foreign Relations
conducted a closed-door interview with Secretary of State Monroe.

When

asked whether the United States was prepared for war, Monroe was
proported to have stated:

"'As to the prepared state of the country,

in case of a declaration of war, the President would not pledge himself, nor take more than· his share of the responsibility. 11115

But
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the President pushed the issue and within a week he began the final
drive towards war.
Madison's unswerving advocacy of war was crucial.

War sentiment

had been stronger, earlier, in Congress but the pro-war group in 1812,
though loosely organized, still expressed the dominant mood.

The

President's stubborn persistence, with aid from connnittee chairmen,
eventually solidified a sufficiently large Republican majority to gain
his declaration of war.
At this crucial point, there was total unity in the_ President's
immediate circle.

Madison dominated the cabinet.

Gallatin and

Secretary of War Eustis, despite their pro-British leanings, were
solidly behind the President.

Secretary of the Navy Paul Hamilton

was completely devoted to the Administration and Monroe broke his last
ties with the Randolphites.

16

The cabinet met on May 11 and two days later the House voted
to recall absent members so that they could reach Washington by June
1.

On May 18 the Hornet

arrived in America.

carrying diplomatic information from England

Administration spokesman, Richard Rush, claimed

that the dispatches contained no new revelations about British foreign
policy.

A secret session of Congress was held on June 1 and Madison

. . 17
sent a message asking for a declaration of war against Great Britain.

Aiming at the Federalists and those malcontents who had obstructed
his proposed war preparations, Madison stated in part:
And I do moreover exhort all the good people of the
United States • • • (to) exert themselves in preserving
order, in promoting concord, in maintaining the authority
and the efficacy of the laws, and in supporting and
invigorating all the measures which may be adopted
by the Constituted Authorities, for obtaining a speedy,
a just, and an honorable peace.18

(44)
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WHY WAR?

The New York legislature adjourned on June 20, two days after
Congress declared war against Great Britain.

New York Congressmen,

for the most part, voted against the declaration either because they
did not feel New York and the nation·were prepared for hostilities
or because they felt the declaration was wrong. 1

Twenty-two Repub-

licans in Congress, mainly Clintonians, joined the Federalists in
opposing war.

2

Many factors had led to the decision for war, but perhaps the
most important one for causing war in 1812 was that this was a
presidential election year.

Herman von Holst stated:

The enthusiasts in favor of war were in a condition
to- give importance to another element, and this
decided the issue. The presidential election was
impending, and the war party made the unconditional
adoption of their policy a sine qua non of his
renomination. That the threat could be carried into
effect was to be looked upon as certain • • . Madison
was not a man of such rigid moral firmness that his
convictions could have withstood such a temptation.
He fell victim, like others before him • • . to the
presidential fever.3
Richard Hildreth commented:
The idea of being ignominously thrown overboard by the
upstart and imperious leaders of the war party must,
no doubt, have been in the highest degree mortifying
to these veteran politicians, to whom habit had
rendered official station almost a necessary of
life • • • Madison and Gallatin might find excuse
for submitting their own better judgment to the storm
of popular passion, in the Republican doctrine of
the right of the majority to rule; and they might
hope, by still clinging to the helm, to diminish the
calamities to which the country and the Republican
party might be exposed, under more reckless and
less experienced leadership.
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Whatever might have been Madison's motives, this
at least is certain, that, yielding to the urgency
of the war party, he reluctantly consented to take the
leadership in a new step toward war • • • 4
If Madison had not decided in late 1811 to push the war
issue, the war faction of the Republican party might well have
placed its own candidate in opposition to the President or turned
.
5
to C1inton.
Though a peace candidate, Clinton had become many
things to many factions.

Madison was aware of this.

As a result, it

can be argued that the upcoming election was the deciding factor in his
taking charge of the "war hawk" movement.
Beyond this most significant step, Mad~son sought other ways to
injure Clinton's candidacy.

When the war began, Clinton expected

John Armstrong, a major critic of.Madison's foreign policy and who had
been at odds with Madison
candidacy.

over the Warden· incident, to support his

But New York Governor Daniel D. Tompkins moved to have

Armstrong appointed by Madison as Commander of the Port and Harbor of
New York City.

And Armstrong, due to his Revolutionary War service,

outranked all Major-Generals of 1812, Tompkins thus desired
Armstrong to have an independent command answerable only to the
President or the Secretary of War.

6

On June 20, 1812, Tompkins wrote

to Peter B. Porter; after expressing his position on· Armstrong,
Tompkins stated:
Will you please to consider this communication confidential,
except so far as to make known to the President or Secretary
of War alone its contents, in such a way as may be best
calculated to produce useful ends and to convey to them my
most decided opinion that no arrangement can be made which
will be so satisfactory and beneficial as that of the
appointment of General Armstrong.7

(48)

In short, Tompkins' political ma_neuvering and rhetoric
persuaded Madison to use Presidential patronage to damage Clinton.
On July 6 Armstrong, who had alreadybeen leaning towards a
reconciliation with Madison, accepted a commission of brigadiergeneral with the command of New York City and its defenses.

s

During this same period, on June 24, Tompkins wrote to the
peace candidate Clinton.

Obliquely, Tompkins reminded Clinton

of his responsibilities to the state in his capacities as mayor of New
York City and Lieutenant-Governor of the state.
by Tompkins on Clinton's peace position.

9

This was a coDll!lent

And it was a sample of how the

campaign rhetoric'was heating up as Clinton refused to end his
challenge to Madison.

(49)
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THE CLINTON CANDIDACY:

A RISING TIDE

(i)

Clinton's agents were in Washington and areas of New England
during the summer of 1812.

1

To Federalists they spoke of peace and

to the Republicans they spoke of a President who could wage war efficiently.

Extreme F~deralists, like members of the "Essex Junto,"

were prepared to support Clinton as they had Burr because they hated
Virginians.

In New York, however, the Federalist party was divided

in sentiment.

Those supporting Clinton did so to be rid of Madison.

Gouverneur Morris was so tired of S:outhern domination he favored the
election of Clinton to assert the North's independence, even if the nation
was split in the process.

Eventually, Josiah Ogden Hoffman, Federalist

lawyer and political leader, after private negotiations, pledged
New York City's Federalist delegation to the Mayor.

In addition,

other leading New York City figures and several Congressmen
conferred and gave their belated support. 2

This was a strong, though

limited, beginning for Clinton as he sought Federalist support in the
state.
As Clinton was solidifying his ties with Federalists, a new
problem arose within the Federalist ranks.

Ben Stoddert, Secretary

of the Navy under John Adams, started in July a "draft Marshall"
movement.

Stoddert believed Clinton was a second string Republican

and Madison was a puppet of Jefferson.

The man needed was John

Marshall, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and a Southern
Federalist who could prevent the destruction of the nation.3

Stoddert
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reasoned that any Federalist could win the ninety-five electoral votes
to be found in New England, New York, New Jersey, and Delaware.
The difference between victory and defeat lay in Virginia and North
Carolina.
states.

And Marshall was the only man who could win those two

4

Albert Beveridge, biographer of Marshall, stated that were it
not for Clinton's efforts and the Federalists' desire to retain Marshall
as Chief Justice, the Virginian might have been a candidate in 1812.
Beveridge believed that because Marshall would have done better among
the mercantile classes, lawyers, and Federalists in general, that he
might have carried North Carolina, Vermont, and Pennsylvania and won the
election. 5

This was probably wishful thinking on Stoddert's and

Beveridge's part.
The Federalists were in a dilemma.

Marshall's assets included

not being tainted by any connection with New England secessionism and
not having Clinton's reputation for intrigue.

But the bottom line

was that Madison must be defeated in New York for a Federalist to
6
win and only Clinton seemed able to accomplish that.
On September 3, Stoddert told John Steele of North Carolina
that his state might cast the deciding votes for Marshall, but if
Marshall declined to stand as a candidate then Clinton would be taken
7
to save the country from Madison.
Marshall declined and Clinton
moved closer to obtaining a national Federalist following.
(ii)
New York remained a trouble spot fdr Clinton.

To impress the

(52)

rest of the nation's Federalists, he must set his own house in order.
William Coleman, of the Evening Post, visited Rufus King on July 27
and said that Clinton had promised a group of Pennsylvania Federalists
to make immediate peace if elected President.

Four days later, Dr.

John Mason, provost of Columbia College, met with Rufus King, and
related how Clinton had told him that he would welcome Federalist support
against Madison.
b~fore answering.

But King declared he must confer with his colleagues
As a result, King met on August 3 at Morrisania with

Gouverneur Morris, John Jay, and William Clarkson.

Here, King revealed

his opposition to Clinton whom he felt would abandon his present supporters
and uriite with rival factions when politically expedient.

Furthermore,

he believed that so long as Armstrong, Tompkins, and Spencer opposed
him in New York, he was too risky to endorse, especially when he might
misrepresent Federalist motives.

King wanted Federalists to keep their

integrity by supporting no one or else a Federalist. 8
Two days after this meeting, Clinton went to Morrisania and
met with King, Jay, and Morris.

During the discussion Morris read the

proposed peace resolutions that were to be made public at the first
meeting of the "Friends of Liberty, Peace, and Commerce" organization.
Clinton wanted postponement of the public release of these proposals
until after he had secured dissident Republican support more solidly
behind him.

He claimed he was not temporizing; he was permanently split

with the Madison Administration.

Additionally, he argued that had he

followed the Administration's line he would have eventually become
President, but he refused to follow such a course.

The Federalist
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leaders refused to call off the August 18 peace rally.

9

By now,

however, most New York Federalists decided that they would risk
supporting Clinton, King being the most notable exception.
At Washington Hall on August 18 a large crowd adopted eight
resolutions condemning Madison's anti-commercial policy, stressi~g
the country's financial and military unpreparedness for waging a
war, and calling for committees of correspondence.

10

The day before the Washington Hall meeting, a committee of
New York Clintonians issued their "Address to the People of the
United States," a document that sought a broad national public appeal:
They opposed the Congressional caucus arguing that this was an encroachment by the legislative branch into the area of the executive branch,
and cautioned that the small minority that controlled the caucus might
be influenced by a foreign power.

The "Address" also appealed to the

North's jealousy of Virginia and stated that New York, a middle
state, might hold the balance between the conflicting agricultural
and commercial states.

And since New York was a frontier state this

was even more of a reason for it to be the home of the next President.
In concluding, the pamphlet said that Madison had led the nation
unpreparedly into war, and that the Administration had been inept in
conducting the war.

By comparison, Clinton was an energetic, adminis-

.
.
. kly. 1l
trat1ve
giant,
who ha d the abi 1·1ty to end t h e war qu1c
(iii)
September brought the-Federalist convention in New York City,
an event. that Clinton hoped would push him ahead of Madison.

This
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gathering resulted from a summer meeting at Saratoga Springs when
William Sullivan, the president of the Boston branch of the
Washington Benevolent Society, and some friends met shortly after
war had been declared.

There Sullivan and Jonathan Knight: both of

. Massachusetts, and Connecticut's Governor Roger Griswold, decided
that a Federalist convention should be held in the early autumn. 12
Helping to bring these Federalists together were Philadelphia Federalists,
New Jersey Federalists, and John Pintard of New York, all of whom
· corresponded with Federalists throughout the nation. 13
Through their efforts and the efforts of others, a Federalist
convention was held September 15-17.

More than sixty delegates·

attended representing eleven states.

In addition, there was extensive

COIIIIIlunication with North Carolina and Virginia Federalists.

Ohio was

the only state that had active Federalists but was unrepresented.
The delegates came from all the states north of the Potomac and from
South Carolina, and they met at Kent's Tavern on Broad Street to hold
thier proceedings.
weather.

The small Southern turnout was due to distance and

In addition, the Virginia Federalists organized their own

state convention.

Overall, the delegates were chosen by state general

coIIIIIlittees or coIIIIIlittees of correspondence and thus did represent the
state organizations though not necessarily the rank and file.

14

No major Federalist figure was willing to accept the Presidential
nomination -- Jay, King, and C. C. Pinckney refused.

Consequently, the

issue became whether to support Clinton or to sit out the race.

15

Rufus King viciously attacked Clinton's character, and emphasized party
integrity.

This type of Federalist opposition to Clintonians had

(55)

deep roots.

For between 1777-1800 the greatest enemies of the

Federalists had been George Clinton and his followers.

And even after

1800 when the Federalists alternated their allegiance between fending
Rep'ublican factions, there never occurred a time when a high
,

percentage of Federalists was aligned with the Clintonians.

16

Those who did not trust Clinton and yet who, did not want to sit
out the contest attempted to implement their "Southern Strategy,"
that is choosing some prominent Southern Federalist who might
garner enough North Carolina votes to win.
original idea as proposed by Stoddert.

This was based on the

The group, however, was

confounded by a letter sent to the convention by C. C. Pinckney declaring
that no Southern Federalist should be supported.

17.

The other position presented was the one that for the most part
car.ried the convention.

The Massachusetts Federalists led by Harrison

Gray Otis felt that there was no hope_ of electing a candidate to the
Presidency unless they combined with dissident Republicans.
urged an alliance to defeat Madison to obtain peace.

18

They

Otis managed

to ,get a resolution adopted opposing the nomination of a Federalist. 19
To Clinton, who might alienate dissident Republicans if he associated
1

too closely with Federalist policies, the convention gave him all that
he could desire.
Five Pennsylvanians were appointed as a committee to learn the
views of the electors picked by the states and then to inform the
electors of other states.

Therefore, most Federalist delegates left

the convention with the understanding that a formal nomination of
Clinton would depend on the judgment of the Pennsylvania committee
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and in particular the situations in Pennsylvania and North Carolina.

20

After the convention, Robert Goodloe Harper wrote that the object
was "'to let the Clintonian Democrats take the lead, in all the
Democratic states and districts, and to support them silently with our
votes.'"

The desire was to carry all seaboard states from North

Carolina northward except for Virginia. 21

Clinton's hope for secrecy

vanished a month later when the National Intelligencer exposed his plan.
Clinton and the Federalists denied the accusations but the disclosure
upset their plans. 22
After the convention the controversy in the press grew more
23
bitter.
Maturin Livingston said that in New York Clinton's patronage
control allowed him to maintain presses in all of New York's counties
and to use the New York Columbian as a vehicle for propaganda.

The

Clintonian press attacked the idea of Congressional caucus
-nominations and said that New York deserved a President.
positions were countered by the Madisonian press.

These

First they pointed

out that the President's renomination had been approved by nine state
legislatures including Pennsylvania's and Massachusetts'.

In Pennsyl-

vania it was argued that the Keystone state had a better claim on the
Presidency than did New York, and yet Pennsylvania was supporting
Madison.

Overall, Clinton was backed by most Federalist newspapers,

and Madison by almost every Republican paper outside of New York.

24

This alignment of papers, however, proved unimportant as in the autumn
25
weeks of 1812 many newspapers made no mention of the election.
Despite the mostly unified support Federalists had given to
Clinton, there were pockets of unrest.

The greatest example was in
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Virginia.

In that state the Federalists were very weak with no

representation in three-fourths of the counties.

But as a result of

their dislike of Clinton, the Federalists of Loudon County, at an August
22 mass meeting, called for a state party convention to be held at
Staunton on September 21.

The turnout was disappointing as only thirty-

two delegates came, and they represented only ninety-nine counties and
cities.

Henry Lee and Charles Fenton Mercer wanted the convention to

let the electoral nominees that were chosen to be given a>free,choice in
supporting any candidate.

This measure failed 15-16.

The convention had

a difficult time choosing a candidate although they remained opposed to
Clinton, feeling that if elected.he only planned to be more aggressive
in the application of Jeffersonian and Madisonian policies.
In the end, the convention nominated New York's Rufus King
and North Carolina's William R. Davis.

The convention created a five

member central committee in Augusta County which was to inform the
electoral nominees of their selection and to arouse support for their
candidates.

The committee was to contact anti-war men throughout the

state urging them to create local organizations for promoting King and
Davis.

The party capped its proceedings by condemning Madison and the

Republican party for bringing on the war and for their conduct of it
.
i t b egan. 26
since

(iv)
Republicans attempted to get Clinton to withdraw his ~andidacy
in late September.

Most specifically, William King, Rufus King's

half-brother, led a delegation of Republicans from Massachusetts to
deliver a letter suggesting that in return for Clinton's withdrawing from

(58)
the race,. the Republican party in Massachusetts in 1816 might support
Clinton.

Since Massachusetts and the North in general had little

influence in Republican party-decision-making, Clinton must have been
amused by this worthless, ambiguous offer.

In response to the Massachu-

setts proposal, Richard Riker, a leading a1d of Clinton's, released a
public statement,

27

stating that the friends of the constitution

throughout the nation looked to him, and he could not decline the
service thrust upon him.

Furthermore, he stated that political

bargains were an affront to Republican dignity, and that he would
28
not withdraw from the contest.
As the election date neared, the Madisonian press began an
increased assault on Clinton's candidacy.
said:

One paper, on October 15,

"We did think that Mr. Clinton would long ere this time have

withdrawn himself -- but we have been disappointed in our expectation
and we have now only to admonish him of the fate of Aaron Burr. 1129
And a group of Pennsylvanians, in referring to Clinton's New Yor~
positions_, wrote:

Mr. Clinton may have filled all of those situations
with ability, and thus been a useful citizen of New
York, but his usefulness has been confined to that
state. He was so short·a time upon the national floor
that the nation know him not; the nation have not tried,
proved and found him honest and capable.30
In addition, on October 10, Madison sent a letter to the South
Carolina legislature acknowledging its address to the President and
the Speaker.

In his politically tinted reply Madison agreed that to

maintain its honor, the United States had to use force and that South
Carolina was very patriotic in its actions.

31
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These politically motivated statements showed that the expected
collapse of the Clinton candidacy had not occurred, and that Madison's
reelection was in doubt.
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THE ELECTION
(i)

Each of the eighteen states set their own date for the presidential
balloting, with Louisia~a having been admitted as the most recent state
on April 8, 1812.

Most states picked electors in the same manner as

in 1808, but there were some exceptions.

Five states chose by

general ticket with the winner taking all the electoral votes -New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Ohio.

Four

states voted by districts with the possibility of a divided electoral
vote -- Massachusetts, Maryland, _Tennessee, and Kentucky.
nine states chose electors by the legislatures.

The other

In several of these

states the legislature was elected during the presidential campaign,
and by indirect election might reflect the popular opinion towards
the presidential candidates. 1
As the balloting began, Clinton was sure to win New York, New
Jersey, Connecticut, and Rhode Island, and Madison was certain of
victory in Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, and the states west
of the mountains except for Ohio.

2

Madison evaluated the situation

on October 14 as follows:
In the Congressional Districts the Republicans, I believe,
have not lost ground at all, notwithstanding the auxiliaries
to Federalism • . • Pennsylvania, although admitted to
be shaken, is represented to be safe. New Jersey is doubtful,
at least the same case with New Hampshire. North Carolina,
also, is reported to be in considerable irritation. The
3
other states remain pretty decided
(ii)
The New York legislature convened on November 2 to pick the
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state's presidential electors with three tickets presented -- the
Madisonians, the Clintonians, and the Federalists.

The Federalists

had a small majority in the lower house; the Republicans (predominantly
Clintonian) had a majority in the upper house.

The choice of the

electoral ticket was by joint session, thus the Federalists could not
win but might be the deciding factor. 4 A Republican caucus failed
to nominate a list of electors thanks to Madisonian obstructionism.

The Martling Men wanted a portion of those chosen to be for the President.

The Clintonians refused this, and finally a Clintonian ticket

headed by Judge Robert Yates was chosen.
nominated in the Senate.

This arrangement was

In the lower house the Federalists had

fifty-eight votes for their electors, the Clintonians had twenty-nine,
and the Madisonians twenty-two.

In joint session a number of the

Federalists upheld the decision to support Clinton resulting in
Clinton receiving seventy-four votes, the Federalist ticket received
forty-five, while the Madisonians cast twenty-eight blank votes. 5
In New Jersey the Clintonians surprised the Madisonians by
holding a peace party convention at the end of June, denouncing the
caucus system and nominating Congressional candidates who had opposed
the war declaration.

In this manner they hoped to attract dissident

Republicans. The regular Republicans moved up the date of their convention from the autumn to July 10 to meet this challenge.

One

hundred delegates met at Burlington and issued a public address setting
up a formal convention for Trenton in October. 6

There they created a

committee consisting of two delegates from each county to draw up
lists of nominees for. Congress and presidential electors.

Another
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connnittee drew up a platform expressing its principles.
In addition, the President made a rare campaign statement sending
a letter to the New ,Jersey convention which found its way into the
state's Madisonian press.

In the letter, the President defended his

action in the war, promised an honorable peace, praised New Jersey's
patriotism during the Revolution, and appealed for the state to
continue that tradition during the present crisis.
The state election in October had a voter turnout that was very
high statewide, yet the level of participation varied.

Republicans,

who were against the war but not for Clinton, stayed home.

Generally,

however, the election showed the high intensity created by the election,
and the sophistication of the state's political parties.
a statewide majority of four thousand.

Madison won by

But this vote was deceptive

because the President's majority was primarily derived from two counties.
As a result, the Federalists captured the legislature.

The fusion

of Federalists and Clintonians was more complete in New Jersey than in
any other state except for Massachusetts and they innnediately replaced
the popular election of electors with selection by the legislature,
guaranteeing eight electoral votes for Clinton.

7

Connecticut and Rhode Island were two assured Clinton states.
Both were controlled by the Federalists, and both opposed the war
because it disrupted trade.

Delaware, led by Federalists James Bayard

and Louis McLain, was cool towards Clinton.

But Federalist controlled

Delaware did support the New Yorker.
Republicans controlled New Hampshire since 1806.

Nevertheless,

in 1812 the governor's race was very close and some Congressmen began
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to break with the Administration.

New Hampshire's Presidential el_ection

was held on a statewide basis, and the eight Clintonian electors defeated
their opposites by a vote that varied from 20,386 to 18,839 out of 34,800
votes cast.

The war had caused a greater turnout than the previous

years' gubernatorial races, and the Clintonians-Federalists won the
greatest percentage of these.

The biggest gain was in the three

traditionally Federalist, most northern counties which were mostly rural
and which had no interest in maritime rights; instead they feared a
Canadian invasion.

8

In Massachusetts the Republicans had gained in power since the
1790's despite the Embargo and other setbacks.

And in 1811 Massachusetts

elected Elbridge Gerry governor and Republicans controlled the Assembly.
Half of her Congressional delegation were Republicans.
the war changed this.

The coming of

In the spring elections of 1812 Federalist Josiah

Strong defeated Gerry for the Governorship by 1,370 votes out of·l04,000
votes cast and Federalists regained control of the House of Representatives.
For the approaching Presidential election the Republican Senate
sought to have ~residential voting by the district system, hoping
to win a portion of the electoral votes despite the increasing
Federalist tide.

The Republicans managed to have the state's twenty-

two electors divided among six districts, but lost all districts in
November •.
Since Jefferson's Presidency the Massachusetts Republican party
had increased greatly, depending largely on small farmers of the
interior and the rising merchants of the seaboard.

They were parti-
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cularly strong in the mountainous west, in Maine, and along the seaboard
south of Boston.

But it was exactly in these areas that the Republican

vote in November dropped dramatically from that of the previous spring.
There was a suffrage qualification of one year's residence for the
Presidential election that did not apply •in April, but the most
significant reason for the decline in Republican votes was due to·
dislike of the war.

Since there was no corresponding increase in the

opposition's vote it showed that many Republicans opposing the war were
9
also opposed to Clinton and thus stayed home.
Vermont alone of all the New England states entered the Republican
camp.

Since the 1790 1 s the state had inclined towards the Jeffersonians.

In 1812 the war was popular initially.

The Republicans won in the

September state elections; Jonas Galusha defeated Martin Chittenden by
the vote of 19,158 to 15,950 -- a greater plurality than when he beat
Chittenden in 1811.

Except for Windham County in the southeastern

part of the state, the Federalist majorities came from areas adjacent
to Canada and Lake Champlain.

The populace of these areas opposed the

war that was ruining their Canadian trade and which might lead to
.
.
10
invasion.
With the Republican victory in Vermont's state election the
National Intelligencer, expanding its accusations as the Presidential
election approached, stated that the hardy yeomanry of New England
would not adhere to a group that called for a Northern Confederacy
as was exposed in the Henry letters.

11

The September elections led to a meeting of Republican legislators
at Montpelier on October 9.

This caucus adopted unanimously a resolution
12
supporting Madison and Gerry.
And on October 30 the legislature
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elected six electors for the President.

13

In Virginia the election was held on November 2.

The Federalists,

due to the Staunton convention, supported King, though had King won,
there was a chance they would have thrown their support to Clinton.
But there was no doubt that Madison would win the state's twenty-four
electors because balloting was by general ticket.
As a result, only twenty-one thousand out of fifty thousand

eligibles voted.

The Federali,sts won the eastern shore, the upper

Potomac, and the Shenandoah Valley (actually doing better than in
1800).

The Federalists increased their strength in the eastern

shore and the lower Potomac, areas most exposed to the threat of
invasion.

It can be argued that the areas were also affected ~y Henry

Lee, a native son, being one of the martyrs in the Baltimore Riot
(see the Maryland election results).

This sectional pattern had been

fairly consistent since the 1790's indicating that party regularity was
the most important force in 1812.

Overall, Madison dominated by

winning sixty-six out of seventy-nine counties and in thirty-two
counties he received between 90-100% of the vote.

14

In the states of the lower South the Clinton campaign became
inverted from the stance it took in New England.

Completely

discarding the 'peace party' label, the rhetoric became belligerent
and spoke of quickly ending the war by more efficient wartime
management.

15

The situation in the South, however, was not favorable to the antiMadisonians.

The Federalists in South Carolina had been in decline
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since 1800.

By 1812 the party constituted only about ten percent ~f

the vote of the state.

In addition, in 1808 there was a reapportionment

that gave the up-country districts a larger share of the vote, and in
1810 all adult white males were given the right to vote as opposed
to the previous des1gnation of only three-shilling taxpayers.

The

Federalists depended upon the planters, merchants, and professional
men.

In 1812 Federalists centered their effort in Charleston during

the October state, elections.
presidential electors.

The legislature was to pick the

However, the Federalists failed dismally and

the Madisonians were assured of the eleven electoral votes in
December.

16

In Georgia, the Madisonians dominated the political scene
even more.

Federalists hoped to have the legislature choose Republi-

cans who opposed Madison and who were so highly esteemed that they
could vote for Clinton without censure.
illusionary.
17
electors.

This hope, however, was

In late November the Georgian legislature chose Madisonian

Except for King's showing in Vi~ginia, the Federalists in the
18
South did worse in 1812 than they had in 1800 and 1808.
The
pro-war South believed its native son, Madison, was the one for carrying
on the war they had so loudly called for.

And the states of the

Southwest -- Kentucky, Tennessee, and Louisiana -- were also solidly
in Madison's column.

Madison had met their demand for war and they

responded by showing their support.

(70)
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rbid:

THE DECISIVE STATES
(i)
From the start the Clinton camp knew that its success depended
upon a victory in Pennsylvania, or failing that, wins in North
Carolina and either Maryland or Ohio.

Such prospects were bleak ever

since early 1812.
The Pennsylvania situation was desperate from the beginning.
Clinton had Duane's support but the Aurora's editor soon began attacking Simon Snyder, Pennsylvania's Governor.

This was disasteious to the

Clintonians since they hoped to cause a split between Snyder and Madison
by aggravating the wounds suffered over the Olmstead Affair.

Such

hopes vanished when the Governor in early 1812 made a toast stating:
"'The present will be the next President of the United States."'

1

And

then even before the Congressional caucus nomination, the Republican
members of the Pennsylvania Legislature on March 7 prepared an
electoral ticket and pledged their support to the President.

2

Knowing the size of the problem and the necessity to win the
Keystone State, the Clintonians swept into Pennsylvania with ample
funds and flooded the state with speeches and campaign documents.
Special emissaries were sent to pamper and patronize Republican
leaders.

These emissaries, known as 'Boring committees,' had limited
3
.
.
success b ut di.d create a roug h-e d ged state organization.
A key part of this maverick Republican organization was the
inception of a secret group at a meeting in Lancaster on August 26, 1812.
The turnout was small, about a dozen, Congressman Joseph Lefever
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being the only notable present.

The meeting sent out an address to the

people of Pennsylvania attacking Madison and recommending a state
convention be held at Lancaster on September 24.

But the convention

saw only representatives from York, Lancaster, Nazareth, and
Pittsburgh.

Clinton was nominated and former Governor Thomas McKean was

chosen to lead Clinton's list of electors in the state.

4

The most important move of the convention, in its attempt to
overcome Madison's lead, was to name the Pennsylvania Federalist
Jared Ingersoll as Clinton's Vice-Presidential running mate in the
state.

Though this helped to bring together Pennsylvania's malcontents

and Federalists, it did not overcome the general Republican allegiance
to the President. 5

Nevertheless, it made the Clintonian press very

optimistic, and the press even speculated that Governor Snyder was
coming around to Clinton's support and that a Clintonian tide would
•

carry all before it.

6

Their hopes were in vain.

Clinton's forces were on the short-end in a game of numbers.
Except for the nomination of Ingersoll, the Clintonians had avoided the
Pennsylvania Federalists, and refused to denounce the war.

The

Federalists' state organization was pitifully weak, it had only one
member out of Pennsylvania's twenty congressmen.

The party was

active only in Philadelphia and the lower Delaware counties where
Quakers and merchants opposed the war.

Clinton's agents spent most

of their effort trying to sway the regular Republicans by attacking
Madison's policies.

7

The Madisonians countered these attacks by stating that the
President was the peace and commerce candidate -- that Clinton made no
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pledges on the war, ·either way.

Moreover, the state Republican

collllllittee of correspondence issued a continuous stream of campaign
material to the county organizations.

And on September 14, the

Democratic Press, the leading Madisonian paper in the state, revealed
the attendance of Pennsyivania Federalists at the national convention
in New York, and soon after the convention the paper reported that

the Federalists would not run their own candidate.

Thus, the Clintonian

desire for secrecy concerning connections with the Federalists was
unfulfilled.

The Gazette of the United States, the.leading Federalist

paper in the country, hedged its reply to these charges.

It said the

Federalist party would support Clinton only if he had a chance, and it
further said that there was no prearranged understanding.

8

Despite th~se revelations the Pennsylvania Federalists did maintain more secrecy than did their Clintonian Republican counterparts.
In fact, the day after the Lancaster convention, the Federalists held
a conference at Carlisle which was presided over by James Riddle.
They adopted resolutions similar to those passed at the New York
convention the week before.

The general public did not learn of these

proceedings until revealed in a Federalist address only a few days
before the election.

9

When news of Hull's surrender

10

crisis occurred for the Madisonians.

reached Pennsylvania, a major
Word of the capitulation brought

out a flurry of Clintonian supporters with bundles of pamphlets blaming
the Administration for the fiasco.

The agents especially moved among

Pepnsylvania's western mountainous areas, hoping to cause the people
of the region to give their support to Clinton.

The President's
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position was so tenuous that even the destruction of the British vessel
11
Guerriere failed to enhance the Administration's image.
The
possible effect .that Hull's surrender might have on the election worried
Madison's supporters.

Hoping to place the blame solely on Hull, their

rhetoric soon turned in that-direction.

Jefferson wrote to Duane:

"The

treachery of Hull, like that of Arnold, cannot be a matter of blame on
our government."

12

And the National Intelligencer stated that there

had been no deficiency of supplies at Detroit, and that orders for
needed provisions had been issued prior to the declaration of war. 13
Even so, there was much pressure on Madison by party leaders to
dismiss Secretary of War William Eustis and shift the blame on to him.
But Madison refused to sacrifice the incompetent Eustis. To keep
14
Eustis was a political liability,
but to.have· dismissed the Massachusetts native might have been even a greater political liability in a
state that Madison still expected to do well in, in the election.

15

The threat to Madison's political fortunes was short lived.
Military setbacks were offset in the Middle States by the export of
corn and flour to Wellington's armies, raising the price paid farmers.
During peace t:il!le the British had given such shipments special protection,
and after war was declared, the Senate removed a provision that allowed
for the enforcement of the restricted trade by the United States'
forces.

When critics asked about equating the flour shipments with

the rights and true interests of the United States, Madison was
evasive.

He wanted to postpone the issue until his reelection.

Madison

knew that nothing could really be done until Congress reconvened, therefore he saw no reason not to take advantage of the political situation.

16
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Actually the significance of the grain exports went beyond this.
The topic was discussed in letters between Madison and Jefferson.

As

early as April' 17, 1812, Jefferson, in a letter to Madison, attempted
to justify the shipments:
Supposing the objects of the government were merely to
keep our vessels and men out of harm's way, and that
there is no idea that the want of our flour will starve
Great Britain, the sale of the remaining produce will be
rather desirable, and what would be desired even in war,
and even to our enemies. For I am favorable to the opinion
which has been urged by others, sometimes acted on, and
now partly so.by France and Great Britain, that commerce,
under certain restrictions and licenses, may be indulged
between enemies mutually advantageous to the individuals,
and not to their injury as belligerents • • • I think a
people would go through a war with much less impatience
if they could dispose of their produce, and that
unless a vent can be provided for them, they will soon
become querulous and clamor for peace.
Nine days after the declaration of war, Jefferson reminded Madison of
this situation.

Again on August 5 he wrote:

Our farmers are cheerful in the expectation of a good
price for wheat in Autumn. Their pulse will be regulated
by this, and not by the successes or disasters of the war.
To keep open sufficient markets is the very first object
towards maintaining the popularity of the war, which is as
great at present as could be desired. 17
Another argument used by Madisonian Republicans in Pennsylvania
was to declare that only by driving the British out of Canada could
the Indian atrocities in the west be stopped.

Actually, the renewed

Indian activity was a part of continual frontier warfare that was
for the most part unrelated to Britain.

18

Madisonians argued that the

war could be won most easily if the country supported the President.
Madison's defeat would only signal to the British that the United
States had given up the fight for its rights.

How, they asked
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. 11y, cou ld Cl inton
.
·
.· ? 19
rhetorica
ever resurrect t hi s· d etermination.
In addition, the Pennsylvania Madisonian press defended the
Presjdent· and his policies.

The editors stated that it was difficult

and dangerous to prepare for war in peacetime, and only Congress
could provide the means.

20

A great deal of pressure was brought to

bear upon William Duane to completely reject Clinton and take a vigorous
part in Madison's reelection campaign.

21

The pressure forced him to

publicly state his support for the President on October 24, though
some Philadelphia Republicans, led by Senator Michael Leib, remained
opposed to Madison.

22

Preparatory to the state elections of October 13, Federalists
were very active in ward and district meeting.
offered their first ticket since 1808.

In Pittsburgh ~hey

Though they did not denounce

the war in this western town, they did denounce the way it was being
waged.

But the Federalist-Clintonian coalition was a dismal failure
23
in the state elections. The Madisonians triumphed completely.
The Presidential election was scheduled for October 30.

The

Clintonian electoral ticket, headed by ex-Governor Thomas McKean, had
its own problems as a number of the chosen electors refused to run and
the Clintonians were forced to revise their ticket right up to election
day.

In addition, Federalists dropped their neutrality facade, and on

October 17 the party announced its support of Clinton.

24

Most Pennsylvania Republicans had been and continued to be in
the forefront of the war movement in order to preserve the Republican
party. 25

As the election approached, their denunciation of Clinton

became more vituperative.
part of a conspiracy:

They began stating that his candidacy was

(78)
. • . (New York) announces to the world a determination,.
singly, and alone, to oppose, and, if possib:e, d:feat
the deliberate choice of every other state, in which a
democratic majority prevails • • • (Not content with the
promised aid of the self-created convention of federal .
gentlemen recently convened in New York: not content with
the pledg~d co-operation of the self-delegated association of
federalists which lately assembled at Carlisle; not yet
satisfied with the spontaneous devotion of the British party·
in America to the specious pretexts of her ambition:) she has
ventured to introduce her political missionaries, principally
the officers of her government, into every country, in the
vain hope to ·seduce, to alarm, or to corrupt the democracy of
Pennsylvania from the path of honor and of duty ••
You are now to maintain the Republican institutions and
character of our country, in opposition to a combination
of the friends of an aspiring citizen, (De W~tt
Clinton, who has deserted the democratic cause and party)
with the federalists and the British party in America; acting upon
principles and plans of the years 1799 and 1800, as divulged
by their agent, William Cobbett; and recently promulgated and
sanctioned by the acts and proclamations of the government
of Canada.26
·In the Presidential election in Pennsylvania Madison's electors
averaged 48,946 votes to 29,056 for the Clintonians •. Nevertheless,
Madison's majority was ten thousand less than it had been just four
years before; his greatest decline came in the mountain counties of
Western Pennsylvania where he was hurt by the issue of inept waging of
the war.

But still the President won a convincing victory and,

most importantly, Madison garnered Pennsylvania's twenty-five electoral
27
votes.
(ii)
On Monday, November 2, the first.returns from Friday's election
in Pen~sylvania told of Madison's substantial victory in that state.
At this point, all states except three were solidly in either
Madison's or Clinton's column.

The election would be decided by the

(79)

returns frqm Maryland, North Carolina, ·and Ohio.

28

With' the election hinging on these three states, the Administration
tried to assure success by making one last attack on Clintoµ.

On

the 3rd, "An Address to the Electors. of President of the United States"
appeared in the National Intelligencer.

•

A part of it read:

what are we to think of those who would encourage
the illiberal prejudices, the blind jealousies, of a few
malcontents; and lend the credit of New York, a name
hitherto unsullied, to sanctify their mad.ambition, which
would prostrate the most valuable institution of society
to attain its unhallowed object? Among states, sovereign and
equal by the compact which unites them, it is not by
indulging an unholy hatred of each other, that they can
hope to succeed in any object of honorable emulation.
If Virginia be ambitious, is Massachusetts exempt from this·
sin, and may not all the states in turn recriminate one
another? Far better would it be to direct this spirit of
rivalship to improvement in arts, and laws, and beneficient
institutions; in a struggle which shall be foremost in
exalting the glory of the American name _____ • • • 29
Additionally·, in conne.ction with the President's annual message
to Congress on November 4, Madison released diploma~ic correspondence
that became campaign documents in North Carolina and Maryland.

These

documents covered Richard Russell's negotiations with Lord Castlereagh
during the summer.
readiness for peace.

The papers seemed to show evidence of an American
But Castlereagh refused to end the practice

of impressment during the proposed Armistice.

The President announced

further that armistice negotiations were continuing between Monroe
and British Admira"l Warren, though the prospects were not promising. 30
(iii)
The state with the closest race was Maryland.

The political

divisions in the state were traditionally along geographical lines,
as had been the case in Virginia.

The eastern shore of the Chesapeake
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Bay and the Potomac Valley were mostly Federalist, while the rest of
the state was predominately Republican.

As in Massachusetts and Vermont

the Republicans had made steady gains in Maryland since 1800.

By 1812

the party controlled the state's House of Assembly, the Governorship,
and held~ 6-3 advantage in Representatives to Congress.
made victory seem certain for the Madisonians.
at Baltimore.

Thi~ structure

But then disaster struck

31

In the weeks following the declaration of war, two riots occurred.
First, on June 22, the offices of the Federal Republican, the leading
Federalist newspaper of the middle Atlantic states, were demolished by
a Republican mob after the paper printed an especially strong attack
on the war.

Five weeks of silence followed.

Then, however, on July

26, a group of Federalists lodged themselves in a house in Baltimore.
This group consisted of Revolutionary War Generals Henry Lee and James M.
Lingan and other prominent figures.

On the 27th they issued a denun-

ciation of the June 22 riot, and they maintained that there existed
a conspiracy between national and local Republicans whose intention was
to destroy the Federal Republican.
mob.

These statements brought out a new

Both sides were heavily armed and in the ensuing exchange one

Republican was killed.

Soon the militia arrived, the Federalists were

taken into custody, and the mob dispersed.

When the militia disbanded,

however, the mob reassembled and on the night of July 28 they broke
into the unprotected jail.
32
James Lingan was killed.

The Federalists were severely beaten and

The result of the riots was that the public treated the slain
Federalists as martyrs.

In the state election in October the Federalists
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won control of the House of delegates by a vote of 54-26, which would
outweigh the Republican Senate in a joint ballot.
ever, failed to make use of their advantage.
quarreled among themselves.
Clinton in Maryland.

The Federalists, how-

Instead, the Federalists

There had never been much support for

And when Alexander Hanson and Robert Goodloe

Harper supported the New Yorker, many Federalists rebelled. 33
The Presidential election saw Maryland's eleven presidential
electors being chosen by popular vote in nine electoral districts.
Madison won six and Clinton five.

Madison, due to heavy majorities in

two counties, gained two electoral votes in the Federalist stronghold
of the eastern shore.

The decline in Republican votes increased the

further the distance was from Baltimore and Annapolis which may have
shown the rural areas' distrust due to the summer riots.

Federalist

gains came from the lower western shore, an area previously Republican,
and probably resulted from disenchantment with the war and some decrease
in grain markets.

34

(iv)
With the split in Maryland, Clinton needed victories in both
North Carolina and Ohio to unseat Madison.

35

The Clintonians knew that

in all probability the chances of victory in North Carolina depended
upon the method used to choose its electors.

Since 1803 the state

had used the district system, with the result that the Federalists in
36
1808 had won three of the fourteen electoral votes.
But the
Republican controlled assembly of 1811-1812 abolished the district
system of choosing presidential electors and replaced· it with their
election by the General Assembly.

This virtually guaranteed a sweep
of North Carolina's electoral vote by Madison in 1812. 37
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Many-people, including Republicans, were indignant over the
arbitrary action of the assembly.
condemned the action.

County grand juries across the state

This issue combined with the Presidential contest

caused the summer legislative campaign to be the most active since
1800.

After the August elections, the Republicans feared that the

election law had split their party. 38

When the election law was

passed it was not known that Madison could afford to lose some
electoral votes in the state.

Thinking that a few votes might make

a difference the Assembly had taken what turned out to be a great risk.
In fact, there was nothing to gain and much to lose.
The Federalists planned a campaign to take advantage of their
new-found popularity.

And by the end of August the state's Federalists

had committed themselves to support Clinton, believing perhaps they
could attract dissatisfied Republican legislators to their cause. 39
It soon became obvious that Republicans who opposed the electoral law
would not necessarily back Clinton.
the August elections were deceptive.
the House and two in the Senate.

Also, the Federalist gains in
They had gained only ten seats in

The greatest Federalist victories

centered on a group of ten central Atlantic coast counties near Newbern,
and a group of eleven counties in the northern Piedmont.

In these areas

they elected thirty-three assemblymen, fifteen more than the previous
year's figure.

The Federalists •retained the loyalty of those in the South

Central Fayetteville Congressional district, but in the other half of
the state the Federalists actually lost five seats in the assembly.
Overall, the party had only nine against the Republicans' eighty-five.

40
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Faced with this situation, the Federalists attempted to salvage
0

some part of their position by persuading the state assembly to repeal
the electoral law.

To accomplish this end, the Federalists hoped to

induce a leading Republican to become Clinton's running-mate in the
state.

Governor Hawkins, ex-Governor Stone, and Nathaniel Macon

were all mentioned.

In particular, much effort went into attempting

to persuade Governor Hawkins.

Hawkins did not completely agree with

Madison's war policies, but he was a member of the "Warren Junta" and
he remained loyal to the Madison Administration.

And without Hawkins'

assistance in calling a special session of the legislature to try to
revoke the electoral law there was little chance of overcoming the
Madisonian position.

41

To compound the Federalists' problem a story circulated by
Madisonians said that two Clintonian agents had arrived in North Carolina
with funds to bribe the assembly.

And Clinton's ambivalent war

position did not set well with the staunchly pro-war state.

42

When

election returns showed that a complete sweep was needed by Clinton
in North Carolina to win the election, the challenge to Madison quickly
began to crumble.

When the Assembly met in early November to cast their

ballots for Presidential electors there was no doubt that the Clintonian
plans for capturing the state's electoral support had failed.

The

Republican caucus whipped its members into line and the President
won by an overwhelming vote of 130-60, with even some Federalists
43
voting for Madison.
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(v)

Despite the crushing news of the defeat in North Carolina, some
Clintonians, even as late as the middle of December, hoped for
eventual victory.

This last, desperate chance was based on the

fact that Ohio, which had been won by Madison, had lost one of its
electoral votes because of the absence·of one elector.

In addition,

Pennsylvania had four vacancies occur among its chosen electors,
and the state legislature had appointed new electors after the
legally set deadline for such appointments.

Thus, the Clintonians

considered them to be illegal, and therefore; they also felt that
this caused the rest of Pennsylvania's electors to be illegal.since
they had all voted together.

This interpretation did not hold up.

All pf Pennsylvania's electoral votes were declared valid, and Clinton
ran out of time and votes.

44
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THE END RESULT:

AN EVALUATION

Nationally, Madison won 128 electoral votes to Clinton's
eighty-nine.

The election had been sectional.

Every state located

east of the Delaware river (save Vermont) gave its electoral vote to
Clinton.

And every state south and west of the Delaware river (save

Delaware) gave its electoral vote to Madison.

Maryland divided.

1

From New Hampshire to Delaware, and including part of Maryland,
Clinton won the electoral vote of every seaboard·state.

Madison carried

every other state in a contiguous but extensive grouping that spread
from Pennsylvania to Georgia, Louisiana, and Ohio, in addition to the
isolated Vermont.

2

Of the original thirteen states New England gave

its forty-three votes for Clinton, the states south of the Potomac
gave fifty-nine votes for Madison, and the Middle States gave thirtyone for Madison and forty-six for Clinton.
and Clinton eighty-nine,.a virtual tie.
gave their thirty-eight votes to Madison.

This gave Madison ninety

But the five new states
3

By the summer of 1812 there were three main viewpoints concerning
how American diplomacy should be oriented.

Basically, the Madison

Administration believed that after the Louisiana Purchase and the
destruction of France's naval power at Trafalgar, the French were no
longer a threat to the United States' interests, but that Great
4
Britain remained a menace to those interests. . And a majority of
the Republican leaders throughout the nation, particularly in the
Republican strongholds of the South, West, and in Pennsylvania were
against making concessions to maintain peace.

Therefore, any such
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ideas were discarded.
Federalists agreed that Britain's policies were restrictive in
regards to trading with countries on the continent, but they said that
Napoleon's decrees already closed those markets.

Hence; the realistic

thing to do·was to trade under British regulations which still left the
rest of the world's marketplaces open.

With the destruction of

much of Europe's maritime fleet and with the promise of new markets
in the Spanish Empire, this avenue seemed even more to be the correct
•

policy.

5

Furthermore, they believed that war with England was mere

folly, and once it had begun they strove to end it immediately.
Within this conflict of opinions between the Federalists and
the Republicans, and with the added dissension within the Republicans'
own ·ranks, De Witt Clinton saw a chance to cap·ture the Presidency, which
had so long eluded New York and particularly his family.

His

viewpoint was that the war should never have been started, but once it
had begun the most efficient administration should be in control.
Moreover, he was convinced that the Madison Administration was
unreasonably biased against Britain and too easily served France's
interests.

Therefore, he felt that his election would be the quickest

way to bring about peace negotiations.

Though unlike the Federalists,

he was willing to continue the prosecution of the war in order to obtain
just peace terms for the United States.
Historians analyzing the Clinton candidacy have been almost
unanimous in their condemnation.

Such analyses tend to be inadequate

for they blame on one man what was in fact a national malady.

Though

De Witt Clinton was ambitious for himself, he was also ambitious for
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his state and for the North in general.

De Witt Clinton was the

product of twenty years of New York political discontent.

In 1812

he attempted to·create a new opposition party to oppose the ruling
Virginia based party.

In addition, despite what many historians have

stated, the New Yorker was not politically inept.

His ambitions

were advanced by calculated decisions in which he weighed the
conflicting political forces and developed a plan of operation that
came close to success.

But the events that Clinton used to challenge Madison were also
the events that prompted ·the President into actions that prevented
the New Yorker from achieving victory.

And as a result, the defeat

of the forty-three year old Clinton brought an end to his national
political career.
The crux of the election came down to whether Madison would
decide for war against Great Britain.

The malcontents within the

party were the first to bring pressure on Madison to move in the
direction of a more belligerent stand:

And soon it was obvious that

this met the desires of many of the.leaders in the controlling sections
of the Republican party,

They were desirous of a belligerent

approach for a number of reasons including nationalistic, economic,
and political ones.

Thus, Madison felt that the actions by these

malcontents would split the Republican party into peace and war factions.
Believing

the war

faction to be the stronger of the two, the President

began taking control of the move towards belligerency.
Madison, like John Adams in 1799, was faced with a demand for
war from within his party.

Adams chose to suppress the movement though
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it resulted in a split Federalist party and was a major factor in
his failure to be reelected.

Madison, however, whatever his feelings

about a war, decided to take command of the pro-war forces.
President succumbed to political expediency.

The

In so doing, he saved

his Presidency, he prevented the Republican party from being split
apart, and he led the nation into a war that was perhaps avoidable,
Indeed, long-term preconditions for war, valid and not valid,
existed, but the final decision for war·was determined by realpolitiks
on the domestic political level not by realpolitiks in foreign affairs.
In fact, the domestic considerations actually forced the United States
into diplomatic maneuvers that were premature at best.
failed to balance ends and means.

The President

As New York Senator Obadiah German

said during the war declaration debates:

"Can we look for a blessing

without the use of rational means?

Can we expect to reap, if

we neglect to sow?
and thistles."

If we do, the crop will surely be briars, thorns,

6

A delay by Madison in asking for a declaration of war would have
allowed the government more time to ready its war preparedness measures,
it would have given the British more time to reconsider their
orders-in-council,

7

and a delay would have enabled Madison to gain a

more clear idea of Britain's position in Europe following France's
attempted invasion of Russia.
tight schedule.

But politically Madison was on a very

Since the end of the Foster talks in 1811 the President

had not considered as desirable any delay in the push for war against
the British Empire.

Under such circumstances, the untimely and ill-
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prepared crusade was launched.

America's true interests were relegated

to second place behind the quest for political power.
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